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UPDATE TO: COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR
COMPUTER SOFTWARE IN THE NINETIESt
by Evan Finkel-t
Computer software copyright law is in a constant state of flux.
Discussed below are some interesting events in the software copyright field which occurred in the few months since the original article Copyright Protection in the Nineties was first published.
1. "Add-On" Software As Possible Infringement A
Final Decision In Nintendo/Galoob.
A final decision has now been issued by the district court in the
Nintendo case.' Plaintiff Nintendo markets its microprocessorbased Nintendo Entertainment System (NES) console in which
copyrighted video game cartridges are inserted and played using a
home television as the display screen. Nintendo and its licensees
market copyrighted video game cartridges. The video game cartridges store a computer game program in ROM (i.e., Read Only
Memory chips) which generates the game output on the television
screen. Thus, two distinct copyrightable "works" are permanently
fixed or stored in ROM: a computer program which is a "literary
work" and the game display which is an "audiovisual work." 2 Operation of the video game cartridge is controlled by a microprocessor in the console which executes the game program in the ROM of
the game cartridge. Data stored at various addresses in the ROM
set certain "parameters" for the game, such as the speed, starting
level of difficulty, or number of "lives" that the player has before
the game ends.
Defendant Galoob markets a video game accessory product
known as the Game Genie Video Enhancer (Genie). Genie sits beCopyright © 1991 by Evan Finkel, All Rights Reserved
t The original article, CopyrightProtectionfor ComputerSoftware in the Nineties, was
published in the previous issue, 7 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER AND HIGH TECH. L.J. 201
(1991).
t Spensley Horn Jubas & Lubitz.
1. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)1662
(N.D. Cal. 1991), appealpending,923 F.2d 862 (9th Cir. 1991), discussed in Evan Finkel,
Copyright ProtectionFor Computer Software in the Nineties, 7 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER &
HIGH TECH. L.J., 201, 238-40 (1991).
2. See Finkel, supra note 1, at 205 n.20 and see infra note 51 for the statutory definition of a "literary work" and an "audiovisual work" provided in 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1992).
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tween the console and the video game cartridge. Genie allows the
user to select up to three "codes", each of which provides a new
value for a game parameter and also indicates the address in the
game ROM where the original value for the parameter is stored. As
the game proceeds, microprocessor inquiries directed to the game
cartridge's program ROM pass through Genie. If an inquiry from
the microprocessor is directed to an address in ROM that matches
one of the user-selected codes, Genie returns the coded data rather
than the original data stored at that address. In this way, the user
can alter up to three game parameters each time the game is played.
Nintendo argued that Galoob was infringing its copyright in
the audiovisual display (work) generated by the game cartridges.
More specifically, Nintendo contended that Genie, used in conjunction with a game cartridge, produced an audiovisual display (work)
which was "derivative" of the audiovisual work normally produced
by the game cartridge alone. According to Nintendo, the consumer
was thus directly infringing Nintendo's exclusive right, granted to it
by § 106(2), "to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted [audiovisual] work." 3 Since the consumer was directly infringing Nintendo's copyright, Galoob was liable for contributing to
such infringement.
The court soundly rejected Nintendo's argument, reasoning:
[T]his Court concludes that inherent in the concept of a "derivative work" is the ability for that work to exist on its own, fixed
and transferable from the original work, i.e., having a separate
"forn". See § 101 (derivative work definition). The Game Genie does not meet that definition. ... Once the Game Genie and
its attached game cartridge are disconnected from the NES, or
the power is turned off, those changes [to the audiovisual display
of the game cartridge made using Genie] disappear and the video
game reverts to its original form. No independent, fixed work is
created.4
In other words, Genie was simply "a tool by which the consumer may temporarily modify the way in which to play a video
game, legally obtained at market price," but did not create a separate independent work.5 The court analogized the modified audiovisual display produced when Genie is used with a game cartridge
"to skipping portions of a book, learning to speed read, fast-forwarding a video tape one has purchased in order to skip portions
3. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (1992). See Finkel, supra note 1, at 207 n.28 for the statutory
definition of a "derivative work" provided in 17 U.S.C. § 101.
4. Nintendo, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1667.
5. Id.
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one chooses not to see, or using slow motion for the opposite reasons." 6 According to the court, "[n]one of those practices permanently modifies or alters the original work, none produces a
separate work which can then be transferred in any way, none replaces the original work, and none deprives the copyright holder of
current or expected revenue."7 According to the court, the same is
true of Genie relative to the original game cartridge.
The court's analysis, while convincing at first blush, is fatally
flawed. The court's entire analysis stems from its interpretation of
the statutory definition of "derivative work" as requiring the work
"to exist on its own, fixed and transferable from the original work,
i.e., having a separate "form." 8 But that is simply not so.
The copyrighted work must be "fixed in any tangible medium of
expression" to be protectable and registrable. 9 There is no doubt
that Nintendo's audiovisual work is fixed in the game program
stored in ROM which produces that work.10 Therefore, ff copyright were to be claimed in a "derivative [audiovisual] work," that,
too, would need to be fixed in some tangible medium of expression.
But there is no statutory requirement that a derivative work
needs to be fixed and, thus, transferable to be an infringement. The
statutory definition of "derivative work" in § 10111 conspicuously
omits any requirement that the work be "fixed," a term used many
other places in the Act.12 And the exclusive right granted to the
copyright owner is the right to "prepare derivative works."1 3 The
term "prepare" was carefully chosen by Congress. It does not imply
that the work need be fixed. If the intent was that the work needed
to be fixed, Congress would have granted the copyright owner the
exclusive right to "create derivative works," since the Act provides
that "[a] work is 'created' when it is fixed in a copy." 4 Indeed, the
House Report accompanying the Copyright Act of 1976 expressly
states that
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1992).
10. See, eg., Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 704 F.2d 1009, 1010-11 (7th Cir.
1983), aff'g 547 F. Supp. 999 (N.D. Ill. 1982), (video game audiovisual display fixed in ROM
containing program producing the display), and cases cited therein.
11. See Finkel, supra note 1, at 207 n.28 for the statutory definition of a "derivative
work" provided in 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1992).
12. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1992) (definition of "copies", "created", "fixed") and § 102(a)
(defining subject matter of copyright).
13. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (1992).
14. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1992) (definition of "created").
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[t]he exclusive right to prepare derivative works, specified separately in clause (2) of § 106, . . . is broader than that [exclusive]
right [of reproduction provided in clause (1) of § 106] ... in the
sense that reproduction requires fixation in copies .... whereas
the preparation of a derivative work... may be an infringement
even though nothing is ever fixed in tangible form.15
As to the transferability of a work to be an infringement, the
exclusive right is to "preparederivative works," 16 whether or not
the work is transferred or transferrable. The exclusive right to "distribute" copies of a work is a separate right granted in § 106(3).
The court's decision is also contrary to the Seventh Circuit decision in Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic International,Inc.17 In Midway,
the plaintiff had an audiovisual copyright on its video game. Defendant sold a printed circuit board which sped up the video game.
The court held that when the consumer used the defendant's board
he generated an audiovisual work which was a "derivative work" of
the plaintiff's audiovisual work and thus, infringed plaintiff's copyright. Defendant was subject to liability for contributing to that
infringement.1 8 The Nintendo court attempted to distinguish Midway on two grounds, both of which are devoid of merit.
First, the Nintendo court stated that "[t]he result [in Midway]
appeared to be based on the equities of that situation," and the equities were different in the Nintendo case. 19 However, while the equities may play an important role in determining whether the
consumer's use of Genie or the speed up kit is a "fair use" under
§ 107 (an issue discussed below), they have no place in making a
determination as to whether a work meets the unambiguous statutory definition of a derivative work.
Second, the Nintendo court stated that "Midway's result, if not
its analysis, appears to have turned on the fact that the licensee
arcade owner, not the copyright holder, was making money from
the public performance of the altered game, a violation of § 106(4)"
(copyright holder has exclusive right "to perform the copyrighted
work publicly").2 0 Once again the court made a gross error. The
Midway case was decided on the ground that the copyright owner's
15. COMMENTS OF HOUSE JUDICIARY COMM. ON 17 U.S.C. § 106, H.R. REP. No. 941476, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 62 (1976).
16. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (1992).
17. Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artie Int'l, Inc., 704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir. 1983), aff g 547 F.
Supp. 999 (N.D. Ill. 1982), discussed in Finkel, supra note 1, at 238-40.
18. Artic, 704 F.2d at 1013-14.
19. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1662,
1666 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
20. Id. at 1666-67.
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exclusive right to prepare derivative works under § 106(2) was violated, as the court therein expressly stated, and the decision never
mentioned the copyright owner's exclusive right to perform the
copyrighted work publicly granted under § 106(4).21
It should be noted that Nintendo did not, and could not, properly claim that Genie violated Nintendo's exclusive right to make
derivative works of the game program itself, as opposed to its audiovisual output, as set out in§ 106(2). Genie did not include any program which was derived from and substantially similar to the
copyrighted game program. Further, Nintendo did not, and could
not, properly claim that Genie violated Nintendo's exclusive right
to make or distribute copies of a game program or its audiovisual
output, as set out in §§ 106(1) and (3), since Genie did not include a
copy of anything from the program or its output, and did not produce any copy of anything from the program or its output. Finally,
Nintendo did not, and could not, properly claim that Genie violated
Nintendo's exclusive right to publicly display or perform the game
program or its audiovisual output, as set out in §§ 106(4) and (5),
since the only evidence before the court was that the consumer used
Genie privately, not publicly. However, the court commented in a
footnote that "[t]his Court expresses no view as to whether commercial arcade use of the Game Genie would be an unauthorized
[public] showing under § 106."22
As an alternative ground for finding in favor of defendant
Galoob, the court held that even if the consumer can be said to
create a derivative work when it uses Genie in conjunction with a
game cartridge, that use is permissible as a "fair use" under § 107.
Therefore, Galoob cannot be subject to liability for contributing or
The court stated:
Among a copyright owner's exclusive rights is the right to "prepare derivative
works based upon the copyrighted work." 17 U.S.C. § 106(2). If, as we hold,
the speeded up "Galaxian" game that a licensee creates with a circuit board
supplied by the defendant is a derivative work based upon "Galaxian," a licensee who lacks the plaintiff's authorization to create a derivative work is a direct
infringer through its sale of the speeded-up circuit board.
Artic, 704 F.2d at 1013. The court seems mistaken in referring to the licensee as a "direct
infringer" and the speed-up board as a "derivative work." The speed-up board alone does not
generate an audiovisual work which is derived from (substantially similar to) the copyrighted
audiovisual work. Thus, the speed-up board is not a "derivative work" and the licensee is not
a "direct infringer." It is only when the speed-up board is used with the original Galaxian
game that the copyrighted audiovisual work is modified, thereby creating the "derivative
[audiovisual] work." Therefore, it would be more correct to conclude that the licensee is a
contributory infringer who, through the sale of the speed-up board, contributes to the direct
infringement by the person using the Galaxian game with the speed-up board.
22. Nintendo, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1667 n.4.
21.
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inducing such permissible conduct.2" The use by the consumer was
a "fair use," because the four statutorily enumerated fair use factors
all militated in favor of a finding of fair use: (1) the non-commercial
nature of the consumer's home use of Genie creates a presumption
of fair use under Supreme Court precedent;2 4 (2) the published nature of video games supports the fairness of a consumer's transitory
alterations of those images; (3) because the consumer has the indisputable right to use the entire game, the amount of the consumer's
use cannot weigh against fair use; and (4) Nintendo failed to carry
its burden of proving injury.25
The Nintendo case is presently on appeal to the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals.2 6 It, like the Midway case before it, may have
profound ramifications in the computer industry, well beyond the
limited field of video games. Arguably Midway may be applied to
computer software areas where a third party develops add-on
software to a popular program such as the Lotus 1-2-3 spreadsheet
program or Wordperfect word processing program. The add on
program would operate as an extension of the original program by
creating a more user friendly display, adding functionality, or
speeding up operations. The modified display would be a derivative
work of the original copyrighted display; and, if the add-on program actually modified the original program as it resides on a hard
disk or even as it resides temporarily in RAM (Random Access
Memory) during execution, the add-on program operating in conjunction with the original program would form a derivative work of
the original copyrighted program. On the other hand, Nintendo, if
23. See Finkel, supra note 1, at 264-65 for a discussion of the fair use defense under 17
U.S.C. § 107 (1992).
24. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449 (1984).
25. Nintendo, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1667-73.
26. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 923 F.2d 862 (9th Cir. 1991).
Oral argument was set for March 21, 1992. On appeal, Nintendo is, of course, reasserting its
contributory infringement claim against Galoob. However, Nintendo has added a direct infringement claim against Galoob, asserting that by selling Genie to the consumer, Galoob is

in effect authorizing the consumer to prepare the allegedly infringing derivative works in
direct violation of Nintendo's exclusive right under 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2) (1992) "to authorize
... [others) ...
to prepare derivative works based on the copyrighted work." See Brief of
Appellant Nintendo of America Inc. with Corrected Table of Contents at 33-37, reprintedin
Computer Industry Litig. Rep. (Andrews Publication), Feb. 5, 1992, at 14405-30. Galoob
counters that Nintendo's "direct infringement by authorization" claim is not properly before
the Ninth Circuit because: (1) such claim was first made by Nintendo on the eve of trial; (2)
for that reason, the trial judge granted Galoob's motion in limine to exclude evidence of
"direct infringement by authorization"; and (3) Nintendo has failed to properly challenge the
trial judge's ruling on appeal. See Brief for Appellee Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. at 35-36, reprinted in Computer Industry Litig. Rep. (Andrews Publication), February 19, 1992, at
14462-86.
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affirmed on appeal, might lead to an opposite conclusion. The addon software would not create a "derivative work" display or program which was "fixed" and "transferrable," and the use of the
add-on software by the consumer would be a "fair use" permissible
by statute. We will simply have to await the results of the Nintendo
appeal, and further decisions in this area.
2.

The Importance of Rigorous Clean Room
Procedures.

Computer Associates Internationalv. Altai2 7 is a recent case
which highlights the importance of implementing a comprehensive
clean room procedure when developing a product which is compatible with, or the functional equivalent of, a competitor's product.2 8
In Computer Associates, the plaintiff, Computer Associates (CA),
marketed a task scheduling program called Scheduler for use in
IBM Series 370 mainframe computers. Scheduler included an interface module called Adapter to enable the program to interface
(communicate with) a number of different IBM operating systems
running on the 370 computers. Defendant, Altai, marketed a competitive program which contained a module called Oscar version 3.4
corresponding to the plaintiff's Adapter module. Oscar was written
for defendant by Arney, a former employee of plaintiff. Before leaving plaintiff, Arney illegally copied the source code of Adapter. Approximately 30% of Oscar 3.4 was copied by Arney verbatim from
the Adapter source code.
After being sued, defendant had programmers other than Arney rewrite that portion of the Oscar 3.4 code which had been copied from Adapter. The "clean room procedure" employed began
with an earlier version of defendant's software marketed before Oscar was developed, and with a functional list of parameters and
services needed for the revised code. Eight clean room programmers were used, none of which had been involved in developing or
enhancing Oscar, all of which were denied access to Arney, the
original Adapter code and Oscar 3.4. After the new code was produced, it was combined with the remaining portions of Oscar 3.4,
tested and debugged. The entire process took approximately six
work-months of effort, and resulted in Oscar 3.5. Version 3.5 was
shipped to all new customers, and defendant also shipped version
3.5 as a "free upgrade" to all customers who had Oscar 3.4.
27. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641 (E.D.N.Y.
1991), appealpending,No. 91-7893 (2nd Cir. 1991).
28. That general topic is addressed in Finkel, supra note 1, at 255-66.

COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 8

The court blessed the clean room procedure, finding that plaintiff had not shown that version 3.5 was substantially similar to the
Adapter code. In making that determination, the court compared
the two programs at five different "levels of abstraction" of "increasing generality," 29 giving a decreasing weight to each successive
level. The five levels and their respective weights were: literal
source and object code (1000), parameter lists (100), macros (100),
list of services (1), and overall organization or high-level structure
or general outline (nil).30
The court found that there was no similarity in literal code;
that the similarities in the parameter lists and macros were not
"substantial" since such similarities related almost entirely to matters in the public domain or were dictated by the functional demands of the program; that the list of services and the
organizational chart were of such minuscule importance, since they
were dictated by functional considerations or were simple and obvious, they do not present sufficient evidence of substantial similarity
to warrant a finding of infringement.3 1
It should be noted that by giving so little weight to the fifth
level of abstraction, the overall or high-level sequence, organization
and structure (SSO), the Computer Associates court expressly rejected as inapplicable earlier cases which had placed much greater
emphasis on similarities in SSO in making an infringement determination. 32 Additionally, the Computer Associates court also ruled
that the SSO that matters is the SSO of the computer program text,
not the computer program's behavior or operation. 3 The former
- the SSO of the computer text - is proper subject matter for
copyright protection. The latter the SSO of the computer program's behavior or operation may be considered a "process," "sys29. ComputerAssoca, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1651.
30. Id. at 1652. The "abstractions test" which the court tailored for use in a computer
program copyright case, was first enunciated by Judge Learned Hand in Nichols v. Universal
Pictures, 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) as follows:
Upon any work... a great number of patterns of increasing generality will fit
equally well, as more and more of the incident is left out. The last may perhaps
be no more than the most general statement of what the [work] is about and at
times might consist only of its title; but there is a point in this series of abstractions where they are no longer protected, since otherwise the [author] could
prevent the use of his "ideas" to which, apart from their expression, his property is never extended.
31. ComputerAssoc±, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1651-53.
32. Id. at 1649-51. See, eg., Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d
1222 (3rd Cir. 1986), cerL denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987), discussed in Finkel, supra note 1, at
229-30.
33. ComputerAssoca, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1650-51.
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tem," or "method of operation" which is excluded by statute from
copyright protection.3 4
The ComputerAssociates decision is presently on appeal to the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals.3 5 The case has been fully briefed
and is awaiting oral argument. The scope of protection for the SSO
of a computer program hangs in the balance. Will the Second Circuit affirm the district court's decision and approve wholesale the
lower court's infringement analysis? If so, at least in the Second
Circuit the SSO of a program will no longer enjoy the wide breadth
of protection which it has heretofore been afforded by virtually
every court, beginning in 1986 with Whelan, the landmark Third
Circuit decision in this area.36 Instead, the SSO of program would
be relegated to second class status, given little real consideration in
the infringement review. Thereafter, the various circuit courts
would become tomorrow's battleground for determining the majority and minority views on the protectibility of a program's SSO,
quite possibly leading to the U.S. Supreme Court accepting a petition for certiorari to resolve the conflict.37

3.

Averting Pitfalls When Registering Derivative
Works.

In Computer Associates Internationalv. Altai, 8 plaintiff's certificate of copyright registration was for version 2.1 of Scheduler as
a "derivative work"3 9 of "pre-existing material" in earlier version
1.0, and the certificate stated that copyright is claimed only in "revised code" and "added new code."' However, the Adapter module was first included in an earlier, unregistered version of the
Scheduler program.
34. The Copyright Act of 1976 provides that: "In no case does copyright protection for
an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of
operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described,
explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work." 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1992). See also Finkel, supra note 1, at 221-23.
35. Computer Assocs. Int'l v. Altai, Inc., No. 91-7893 (2nd Cir. 1991).
36. Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3rd Cir. 1986),
cert. denied 479 U.S. 1031 (1987), discussed in Finkel, supra note 1, at 229-30.
37. Indeed, one commentator has already noted that the district court's decision in
ComputerAssocm "has set in motion an engine of controversy that may ultimately generate a
Supreme Court opinion in the area of software protection." Gary Rinkerman, Highlights, 14
Computer. L. Rep. 365 (Computer Law Reporter, Inc.) (November 1991).
38. Computer Assocs., 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641 (E.D.N.Y. 1991), appeal pending,
No. 91-7893 (2nd Cir. 1991).
39. See Finkel, supra note 1, at 207 n.28 for the statutory definition of a "derivative
work" provided in 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1992).
40. Computer Assocs., 20 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1647.
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From these facts, defendant argued that plaintiff could not
maintain an action for infringement of the Adapter code. The
Copyright Act provides that "no action for infringement of the
copyright in any work shall be instituted until registration of the
copyright claim has been made in accordance with this title."4 Defendant therefore argued that registration of the Adapter code is a
statutory prerequisite for filing an action for infringement of that
code. However, according to defendant, plaintiff's "derivative
work" registration of version 2.1 did not extend to the Adapter code
which was "preexisting material" from version 1.0; the registration
only covered new or amended material added in version 2.1.42
Therefore, defendant argued that plaintiff had no registration for
the Adapter code upon which to base its copyright claim. It should
be appreciated that by statute copyright protection for the Adapter
code arose when it was created (fixed in a tangible medium of expression),4" and that while a registration may be a prerequisite to
filing suit, "such registration is not a condition of copyright protection."' In other words, "[t]he registration is... merely the plaintiff's 'ticket' to court; the protection of the copyright arises at the
time of creation."'45 Further, there was no allegation by defendant
that plaintiff was not the owner of the copyright in the Adapter
code or that the Adapter code had fallen into the public domain.
Defendant's argument was simply that plaintiff's copyright registration did not cover the Adapter code and, therefore, plaintiff could
not maintain an action for infringement of its copyright in that
code.
The court rejected the defendant's argument, concluding that
registration of version 2.1 incorporating the preexisting Adapter
code from version 1.0 "was sufficient compliance with the registra41.

17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (1992). There is an exception for actions for infringement of

certain works having a country of origin outside the U.S. Id. See also Finkel, supra note 1, at
206 n.24.

42.

"The copyright in a... derivative work extends only to the material contributed by

the author of such work, as distinguished from the preexisting material employed in the

work, and does not imply any exclusive right in the preexisting material. The copyright in
such work is independent of, and does not affect or enlarge the scope, duration, ownership, or

subsistence of, any copyright protection in the preexisting material." 17 U.S.C. § 103 (b)
(1992).
43. "Copyright protection subsists ... in original works of authorship fixed in any
tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine
or device." 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1992). See also Finkel, supra note 1, at 202-04.
44. 17 U.S.C. § 408(a) (1992).
45. PRC Realty Sys., Inc. v. National Ass'n of Realtors, Inc., 766 F. Supp. 453, 461
(E.D. Va. 1991).
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tion requirement of § 411(a) to permit plaintiff CA to maintain this
4' 6
action against defendant Altai for infringement of ADAPTER.
In essence, the court held that the registration requirement was satisfied where the program version registered included the code which
was copied, even though the code originated in an earlier version of
the program, at least where ownership of copyright in the copied
code was not in dispute. The court noted that a different result
would obtain, if there had been evidence that the Adapter code had
been placed in the public domain, or was owned by someone other
than plaintiff.4 7 Conscientious counsel for defendants in later cases
might also argue that the court's decision should be limited to cases
in which the preexisting code constituted a stand-alone computer
sub-program or module, as was true of the Adapter code.4 8
This decision is quite important to computer software companies. All too often, registration of a current version is the only registration which is secured at the time the copyright owner learns of
the infringement. The copyright owner typically desires to
promptly file suit for copyright infringement and, at least where the
infringement is clear-cut, seek an interlocutory injunction (e.g.,
temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction) against further manufacture and sale of the infringing software. It would be
most disadvantageous if the copyright owner was forced to delay
filing suit until after a registration could be obtained on the earlier
version in which the copyrighted code in question first appeared.
4.

Preemption of State Trade Secret Law.

In Computer Associates International v. Altai,4 9 the plaintiff
46. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641, 1648
(E.D.N.Y. 1991), appealpending,No. 91-7893 (2nd Cir. 1991).
47. Id.
48. In support of that argument, counsel might direct the court's attention to the following passage from the Computer Associates International Inc. v. Altai, Inc., decision:

Moreover, the court interprets the restriction on commencement of an infringement action contained in § 411(a) as not being a bar to CA's claim in this
case. Dr. Davis's testimony convincingly established that a computer program
such as CA-SCHEDULER 2.1, for which registration was obtained, is made
up of a series or collection of sub-programs, many of which are made up of
sub-sub-programs, and so on, down for several levels. As Dr. Davis pointed
out, it would make no sense to permit the copyright of a computer program
that is an operable entity, such as CA-SCHEDULER OR ZEKE, without including in the copyright protection all of the sub-programs and sub-sub-programs, etc., which are combined with other instructions in order to make up
the copyrighted program.
Id. at 1647-48.
49. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641 (E.D.N.Y.
1991), appealpending,No. 91-7893 (2nd Cir. 1991).
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also had a claim against defendant for misappropriation of trade
secrets. Plaintiff alleged that defendant's incorporation of portions
of its Adapter program into its own program constituted willful
misappropriation of plaintiff's trade secrets. The court dismissed
that claim as being preempted by § 301(a) of the Copyright Act
which provides in pertinent part:
On and after January 1, 1978, all legal or equitable rights that are
equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope
of copyright as specified by § 106 in works of authorship that are
fixed in a tangible medium of expression and come within the
subject matter of copyright as specified by §§ 102 and 103,...
are governed exclusively by this title. Thereafter, no person is
entitled to any such right or equivalent right in any such work
under the common law or statutes of any State.50
The court reasoned that the Adapter program, as a computer
program fixed in magnetic or paper media, was certainly a "work of
authorship... fixed in a tangible medium of expression and ...
within the subject matter of copyright as specified by §§ 102 and
103. " 51 Furthermore, one of the exclusive rights of copyright enumerated in § 106 is the right to make copies.52 In this case, plaintiff
alleged that copying the Adapter code into defendant's own program constituted a violation of this exclusive right of copyright and
a violation of plaintiff's trade secret rights. Thus, according to the
court, the right sought to be enforced under state trade secret laws
was "equivalent to" an exclusive copyright right under § 106.
Hence, the trade secret claim was preempted.
The court was careful to point out that while the claim against
defendant alleging illegal copying of the Adapter code into defendant's program was preempted, a trade secret misappropriation
claim againstArney, plaintiff's ex-employee, based on his illegal acquisition of the trade secret code might not have been preempted,
since there is no right of copyright equivalent to protection against
illegal acquisition of the trade secret code. However, in this case,
plaintiff proceeded only against the defendant, and made no allega50. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1992).
51. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1992). 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) provides that original "literary
works" fixed in a tangible medium of expression are copyrightable subject matter. The definition of a "literary work" is set out in Finkel, supra note 1, at 205 n.20. As explained in
Finkel, supra note 1, at 202-04 & 225-28, a computer program, defined in § 101 as a "a set of
statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring
about a certain result," is a "literary work." § 103 relates to compilations and derivative
works.
52. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (1992) provides that an exclusive right of copyright is the right
"to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies ......
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tion that it illegally acquired the code since the evidence was to the
contrary until the lawsuit, defendant had no knowledge or reason to
believe that Arney had pirated the Adapter code.
This case should be considered in fashioning, wherever the
facts allow, a claim for trade secret misappropriation which is not
preempted. As noted by the court in Computer Associates, the
plaintiff "is the master of its own case" and the facts which are to be
"pleaded and proven." 5 3
5. Registration of Typeface-Generating Software: The
Copyright Office Rethinks its Position.
Copyright Office regulations bar registration of a typeface (or
typefont or letterform) and digital data in any form (e.g., "bitmapping", "outlining", "stroke definition" and/or any other algorithm
created as an alternative means of fixing data) for producing a typeface on a display device (e.g., computer display screen, printer or
other output device). The Copyright Office considers the typeface
and its digital representation uncopyrightable subject matter.
Where a master computer program includes data that fixes or depicts a particular typeface, the application for registration must disclaim copyright in that uncopyrightable data that fixes or depicts
the typeface. The Office's position as to digital typefaces is set out
in a September 29, 1988 Policy Decision.5 4
However, the Copyright Office has now said that in light of
possible technological advances over the last few years, it is reconsidering its earlier Policy Decision. 5 To secure information on possible technological developments which might indicate a need to
change its registration policy, the Office conducted a public hearing
on October 4, 1991 and also accepted written statements. It seems
that the overwhelming majority of firms that submitted oral or written statements, argued compellingly for repeal of the disclaimer requirement, so that computer programs for generating typefaces
could be registered like other computer programs, data and all.56
These firms contend that the code of a typeface-generating program
is inseparable from, and has no use when it is divorced from, the
data that fixes or depicts the typeface.5 7 In other words, digitized
typefaces have become computer programs to generate the graphic
53. ComputerAssocs., 20 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1655.
54. 53 Fed. Reg. 38,110 (1988), as explained in Finkel, supra note 1, at 249-50.
55. 56 Fed. Reg. 42,073 (1991).
56. Witnesses Argue That Typeface Software Should Be Registered With No Disclaimers,
42 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA), No. 1051, at 547-48 (Oct. 10, 1991).
57. Id.
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images of characters; they are one and the same."8 Thus, disclaiming the data as is presently required impedes registration of the program, since the copyright applicant is uncertain as to what, if
anything, is actually being disclaimed. 9
6.

Copyrightability of Computer Languages and the
Like Settlement of the Ashton-Tate/Fox Case.

The Ashton-Tate Corp. v. Fox Software case,' was being
closely watched since it was expected that a final decision after a
trial would shed light on important issues, such as the copyrightability of computer languages. However, it now seems that such
will not happen.
The U.S. Government ified an antitrust action against AshtonTate Corporation and Borland International, Inc., alleging that
planned acquisition of Ashton-Tate by Borland may substantially
lessen competition in the market for RDBMS (Relational Database
Management System) software for PCs running the DOS operating
system, in violation of § 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18.61
Thereafter, on October 31, 1991, the U.S. Department of Justice,
Antitrust Division, published a notice stating that the parties had
consented to entry of a Final Judgment.6 2 Pursuant to the proposed
Final Judgment, the acquisition would be allowed to go forward.
Borland would be enjoined from asserting claims alleging infringement of copyright in the command names, menu items, menu command hierarchies, command languages, programming languages
and fie structures embodied in Ashton-Tate's dBASE family of
products, standing alone and apart from other aspects of those computer programs such as the computer program code (including its
structure, sequence and organization) and the user interface. Borland would have ninety days from entry of Final Judgment to dismiss its claims against Fox Software if Fox dismisses its
counterclaims against Ashton-Tate. The proposed Final Judgment
is subject to court approval after the expiration of a 60-day period in
which the public may comment on the proposed Final Judgment.
It now seems that the next best case for clearing up the confusion and uncertainty which exists over the copyrightability of com58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Ashton-Tate Corp. v. Fox Software, No. 88-6837-TJH (C.D. Cal. 1990, filed in
1988), discussed in Finkel, supra note 1, at 234-37 & 272-75.
61. United States v. Borland Int'l, Inc., No. C-913666-MHP (N.D. Cal., filed 10/17/
62.

U.S. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 56 Fed. Reg. 56,096 (1991).
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puter languages and the like is Lotus Development Corporation v.
Borland International,Inc.6" In that case, Lotus alleges that Borland's Quatro and Quatro Pro spreadsheet programs infringe Lotus'
copyright in the user interface, including the menu command hierarchy, of its popular 1-2-3 spreadsheet program. Borland has
moved for summary judgment in part on the asserted ground that
the menu command hierarchy is not copyrightable subject matter.
7.

Copyright Misuse: The Derivative Work
"Bugaboo" Continues.

The affirmative defense of copyright misuse is being asserted by
defendants with ever increasing frequency, and is receiving varied
treatment by the courts. Another recent case addressing the issue is
qad, inc. v. ALN Associates Inc. "
The plaintiff in qad secured a copyright registration certificate
on its computer program called MFG/PRO. The application for
registration, and the resulting certificate, failed to state that MFG/
PRO was a "derivative work" in that it incorporated preexisting
copyrightable subject matter from third party programs designated
HP250 software.6" The plaintiff sued defendant for infringement of
its copyright in MFG/PRO. In support of a motion for preliminary
injunction, plaintiff emphasized all the similarities between MFG/
PRO and the defendant's software. Many of those similarities related to copyrightable matter which plaintiff itself copied from the
HP250 software. However, plaintiff never revealed that fact to the
court, and the court granted the motion. When these facts became
known to defendant, it moved for summary judgment, claiming that
plaintiff misused its copyright in MFG/PRO, and that it should,
therefore, be barred from asserting a copyright infringement claim
against defendant. The motion was granted.
According to the court, plaintiff's failure to state on its copyright application that MFG/PRO was derived from the HP250
software, "though unlawful might not by itself constitute a misuse."66 However, plaintiff's assertion in the litigation of a copyright
in the material copied from the HP250 software constituted copyright misuse. In essence, plaintiff "used its copyright to sue [de63. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., No. 90-11662-K (D. Mass., filed in 1990).
64. qad, inc. v. ALN Assocs., Inc., 770 F. Supp. 1261 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
65. See Finkel, supra note 1, at 207 n.28 for the statutory definition of a "derivative
work" provided in 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1992).

66. qad, 770 F. Supp. at 1266. The court stated that "Ethis opinion need not resolve
that question, because [plaintiff] qad went beyond merely faulty registration by misusing the
resulting copyright in the prosecution of this lawsuit." Id. at 1266 n.14.
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fendant] ALN and to restrain it from the use of material over which
[plaintiff] qad itself had no rights" since the injunction prohibited
copying of material which plaintiff itself copied from the HP250
software; and "[t]hat is a misuse of both the judicial process and the
copyright laws." 6 7 "That copyright misuse extended [plaintiff]
qad's copyright privilege beyond the scope of the grant [of copyright] and violated the very purpose of a copyright, which is to give
incentive for authors to produce."6 8 The court proceeded to grant
defendant's motion for summary judgment, since the copyright misuse defense "is a complete bar to [plaintiff] qad's prosecution of its
copyright infringement case against [defendant] ALN."6 9
In a subsequent opinion, the court ruled that defendant could
recover from plaintiff any damages sustained by defendant as a result of the wrongfully issued preliminary injunction. 70 The court
acknowledged that "[i]t is black letter law that the amount of a preliminary injunction bond normally sets the ceiling for damages obtainable by a party that is later found to have been wrongfully
enjoined. ' 71 However, the court reasoned that where, as in qad,
plaintiff had acted in bad faith in obtaining the preliminary injunction, no such ceiling is to be imposed. Instead, because of plaintiff's
bad faith, it was necessary and appropriate to "make [defendant]
ALN whole."7 2 The damages would be assessed against plaintiff as
a sanction under Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
which governs the issuance of injunctions.
8.

Fraud on the Copyright Office: The Derivative
Work "Bugaboo" Continues Here as Well.

Another affirmative defense being asserted more frequently is
fraud on the Copyright Office, where the alleged fraud was an intentional failure to state in the copyright application that the work to
be registered was a "derivative work" incorporating preexisting
copyrightable subject matter from an earlier work.73
A recent case in this area is GB Marketing USA Inc. v. Gerolsteiner Brunnen Gmbh & Co.7 4 In GB, plaintiff sued defendant for
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
LEXIS

Id. at 1267.
Id. at 1270.
Id. at 1266.
qad, inc. v. ALN Assocs., Inc., 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 206 (N.D. Ill. 1992).
Id. at *4.
Id. at *11.
See Finkel, supra note 1, at 270-77.
GB Marketing USA Inc. v. Gerolsteiner Brunnen Gmbh & Co., 1991 U.S. Dist.
18777 (W.D.N.Y. 1991).
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infringement of its registered copyright in a label for bottled water.
Defendant moved for summary judgment of copyright unenforceability on the ground that plaintiff intentionally misled the Copyright Office by failing to state in the copyright application that the
label to be registered was a derivative of earlier labels of a third
party. The court agreed, held the copyright unenforceable, and dismissed the copyright infringement claim. Interestingly, the court
found the non-disclosure of the derivative status to be particularly
egregious because, under existing law, a label requires a higher degree of originality than other writings. The derivative nature of the
label in suit was therefore especially critical, since it could have led
the Copyright Office to conclude that the label was not sufficiently
original and accordingly reject the application.
9. Intermediate Copying The Atari/Nintendo Case on
Appeal.
In Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America, Inc.,7 the district court preliminary enjoined Atari from "intermediate copying"
of Nintendo's computer program which the court opined constituted copyright infringement. The case is now on appeal to the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. A decision is expected
shortly as the case was presented for oral argument on November 6,
1991.76 The issue of the permissibility of intermediate copying is
squarely presented on appeal, and should be decided by the Federal
Circuit. For example, in its reply brief on appeal Atari attacked the
district court's holding, avd Nintendo's attempt to support that
holding, as follows:
Nintendo urges a rule of law that would preclude software competitors from making intermediate copies of copyrighted computer programs in order to analyze their functionality and, based
on learning acquired, to develop compatible, non-infringing
products. Such a rule would effectively merge copyright and patent, and eviscerate competition in software development. It is
contrary to both statute and judicial precedent, and cannot save
the injunction.7 7
10.

Copyrightability of a "Control Program" in PLA.

On October 9, 1991, Intel Corp. (Intel) filed a copyright in75. Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1935 (N.D.
Cal. 1991), discussed in Finkel, supra note 1, at 265-66.
76. Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., No. 91-1293 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
77. See Brief of Appellant Atari, Inc., reprinted in Computer Industy Litig. Rep. (Andrews Publication), November 20, 1991, at 13984.
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fringement action against Advanced Micro Devices (AMD) alleging, among other things, that AMD's microprocessors (e.g., the
AM386) infringe Intel's registered copyrights in (1) the microcode
program stored in the ROM (Read Only Memory) of Intel's 80386
microprocessor chips (386SX and 386DX chips); and (2) the "control program" stored in the PLA [Programmable Logic Array] of
the same chips.7" While it is settled law that microprocessor
microcode stored in ROM is a copyrightable "computer program"
protected under U.S. copyright laws,7 9 no reported case has considered the issue of whether the contents of a PLA is also protectable
as a computer program. 0 The programmed PLA in suit is apparently used as a decoder for decoding each object code instruction
(e.g., Add contents of register A and register B and place the sum in
register C) into an address in the microcode ROM where the first
microinstruction for executing the object code instruction is stored.
Unfortunately, this case may never come to trial, and a determination of the copyrightability of PLA contents will have to await
another legal confrontation between these or other parties. In April
1987, Intel and AMD entered an arbitration proceeding centering
on allegations by AMD that Intel was in breach of a February 1982
Joint Technology Exchange Agreement." After the liability phase,
the arbitrator held that Intel had in fact committed multiple
breaches of the subject agreement. On February 24, 1992, after the
remedies phase, the arbitrator entered an "Award of Arbitration"
in which AMD was granted a perpetual right (license) dating back
to the day AMD first began development of its AM386 chips, to
make and sell AM386 chips, including the copyrighted ROM-embedded microcode program and PLA-embedded "control program"
which are the subject of the October 9, 1991 copyright infringement
litigation between the parties.8 2 If the award is confirmed, Intel's
78. Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., No. A-91-CA-800 (W.D. Tex., Austin Div., filed Oct. 9, 1991). This case has now been transferred to the San Jose, California
district where another litigation between the same parties over the code of different chips is
pending. Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., No. C-90-20237-WAI (N.D. Cal., San
Jose Div., filed Apr. 23, 1990).

79. See NEC Corp. v. Intel Corp., 722 F. Supp. 861 (N.D. Cal. 1989), discussed in
Finkel, supra note 1, at 225-28.

80. No reported precedent has arisen from earlier lawsuits claiming infringement of a
copyright in a "computer program" stored in a PLA. See, eg., Alloy Computer Products v.
Asadi, No. 87-1285 (C.D. Cal., filed Mar. 23, 1987); and Alloy Computer Products v. Ultatek
Corp., No. 87-6993 (C.D. Cal., filed Oct. 20, 1987).
81. In the Matter of Arbitration between Advanced Micro Devices Inc. and Intel
Corp., No. 626879 (Santa Clara Cty, Cal. Super. Ct., filed April 1987).
82. The award states (in reformatted form for clarity):
AMD is hereby awarded a permanent, royalty-free, non-exclusive, non-trans-
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present copyright claims should be dismissed, as the license granted
by the arbitrator should be a complete defense to Intel's copyright
infringement claims.8 3
11.

Copyrightability of File Structures & Data
Formats.

A recent case decided by a district court in Louisiana, following precedent in the Fifth Circuit,8 4 and rejecting what it perceived
to be the precedent elsewhere,8" has held that "input and output
formats" are not copyrightable. That case is EngineeringDynamics
Inc. v. StructuralSoftware Inc.86
12.

New Deposit Regulations for CD-ROM Works.

A deposit copy of the work (or, in some cases, identifying portions of the work) must be submitted along with an application for
registration of the work. On September 19, 1991, the Copyright
Office issued a final rule, amending its regulations to provide that

"[w]here a work [e.g., automated database, compilation, statistical
compendia and the like] is fixed in a CD-ROM format, the deposit

must consist of one complete copy of the entire CD-ROM package,
ferable, worldwide right (but not the right to assign, license or sublicense such
right to any other party) under any and all Intel copyrights, patents, trade
secrets and maskwork rights contained in the current versions of AMD's reverse-engineered 80386 family of microprocessors, to make, have made by a
third party solely for AMD, use and sell the prior, current and future revisions
and modifications of those products.
Id.
83. Indeed, the award specifically states that "[t]he rights awarded above shall be
deemed effective continuously since the time AMD commenced reverse engineering the
80386 and shall extend indefinitely into the future," and explains:
The intent of this paragraph [5]is to provide a complete and dispositive defense to AMD as to the Intel claims against AMD regarding the technology
and intellectual property used in AMD's current versions of the 80386 in such
lawsuits as Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., (A 91 CA 800) in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of California, and Intel
Corp. v. Advanced Micro Device. Inc., (C 90 20571 WAI) in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California, and to preclude and
defeat other potential Intel intellectual property infringement claims with respect to the technology used in AMD's afore-described past and current versions, and future revisions and modifications, of the 80386.
Id.
84. Plains Cotton Co-Op Ass'n v. GoodPasture Computer Serv., Inc., 807 F.2d 1256
(5th Cir. 1987); Synercom Tech. Inc. v. Univ. Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Tex.
1978). Finkel, supra note 1, at 231-33 discussed infringement issues relating to file structures
and data formats.
85. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990).
86. Engineering Dynamics, Inc. v. Structural Software, Inc., No. 89-1655, 1991 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 13843 (E.D. La. 1991).
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including a complete copy of any accompanying operating software
and instruction manual, and a printed version of the work embodied in the CD-ROM, if the work is fixed in print as well as a CDROM."8 This new regulation was adopted because the Copyright
Office determined that "The CD-ROM package is emerging as a
major format for dissemination of important information and reference works." 8 8
13.

New Regulations for Shareware Recordation.

The Registrar of Copyrights has recently been authorized to
record and provide a certificate of recordation with respect to
shareware, and to compile, periodically publish, and offer for sale,
information with respect to such recordation. Effective October 8,
1991, the Copyright Office issued an interim regulation, establishing
the Computer Software Registry for recording shareware software
and registering documents pertaining to shareware software (e.g.,
licenses), and establishing procedures for donating copies of public
domain software (i.e., software which has been publicly distributed
with an explicit disclaimer of copyright protection by the copyright
owner).8 9 The interim regulation requires that documents be submitted in the form of photocopies or facsimile reproductions, 90 and
also "encourages the submission of a machine-readable copy of the
document in the form of an IBM-PC compatible disk." 91
The Copyright Office explained that the term "shareware" refers to copyrighted software widely distributed by the copyright
owner (e.g., through electronic billboards or disks) with relatively
few restrictions, to give potential users an opportunity to test and
review the software. 9z If a potential user elects to retain and use the
software under license from the copyright owner, such person must
87. Registration of Claims to Copyright: Deposit of CD-ROM Format, 56 Fed. Reg.
47,402 (1991), amending 37 C.F.R. § 202.20(c)(2)(vii). This rule was commented on in Finkel, supra note 1, at 207-12.
88. Registration of Claims to Copyright: Deposit of CD-ROM Format, 37 C.F.R.
§ 202 (1991).
89. General Provisions - Registry of Documents Pertaining to Computer Shareware
and the Donation of Public Domain Software, 56 Fed. Reg. 50,657-59 (1991), codified at 37
C.F.R. § 201.26. This rule was commented on in Finkel, supra note 1, at 285.
90. General Provisions - Registry of Documents Pertaining to Computer Shareware
and the Donation of Public Domain Software, 56 Fed. Reg. 50,658 (1991), codified at 37
C.F.R. § 201.26(d)(2).
91. General Provisions - Registry of Documents Pertaining to Computer Shareware
and the Donation of Public Domain Software, 56 Fed. Reg. 50,658 (1991), codified at 37
C.F.R. § 201.26(d)(4).
92. General Provisions - Registry of Documents Pertaining to Computer Shareware
and the Donation of Public Domain Software, 37 C.F.R. § 201.26 (b)(l) (1991).
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register the use with the owner and pay a registration fee, usually
far below the cost of purchasing comparable software marketed

through more conventional commercial (e.g., mass-marketing)
channels. 3 The Copyright Office believes that "[tlhe shareware
system of marketing software is an increasingly popular way for au-

thors of computer software to enter the software market," and
"[t]he Computer Software Registry is intended as a means for notifying the public of the licensing terms applicable to individual pro-

grams marketed on a shareware basis."94
It is critical to note that registering shareware software in the

Computer Software Registry is not a substitute for registration of a
claim to copyright in the software, which is generally a prerequisite

to filing suit and entitlement to certain remedies in an action for
infringement.15 Further, recordation of a license or other agreement relating to an interest in shareware software is not a substitute
for recordation under § 205, which apparently remains the exclusive
means for perfecting a security interest in a copyright.96

93. 56 Fed. Reg. 50,657; 37 C.F.R. § 201.26 (b)(1).
94. 56 Fed. Reg. 50,657.
95. 56 Fed. Reg. 50,657: "The Copyright Office strongly urges shareware authors to
register their copyright claims in their programs through usual procedures. Only through
prompt registration can authors be assured of statutory damages and attorney's fees under
section 412 of title 17. Participation in the Computer Software Registry is not a substitute for
registration of the claim to copyright."
96. 37 C.F.R. § 201.26(a): "Documents transferring the ownership of some or all rights
under the copyright law of computer software marketed as shareware and security interests in
such software should be recorded under section 205 of title 17, as implemented by § 201.4 of
these regulations"; see also 56 Fed. Reg. 50,657-58:
The legal effect of recording a document in the Computer Shareware Registry
is at the discretion of the courts.... [D]ocuments transferring ownership of the
rights under copyright of programs marketed on a shareware basis should be
recorded under section 205 rather than solely in the Computer Shareware Registry .... In addition, security interests, wills, and bequests regarding programs
marketed as shareware should be recorded under section 205. Timely recordation pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 205 is necessary to be assured of constructive
notice effect against a subsequent bona fide purchaser of the same rights.
See also In re Peregrine Entertainment, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1017 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (recordation under 17 USC § 205 is the exclusive means to perfect a security interest in copyright),
discussed in detail in Finkel, supra note 1, at 286-88.

